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Non-technical summary
The European Telecom Regulatory system is a two-stage system where the European
Parliament jointly with the European Commission (EC) and the member states de-
termines the common regulatory system to be implemented to national laws. Against
this common regulatory background, the EC also intervenes if it suspects a particular
national or international market not to be in line with common EU guidelines. Most
prominent examples of interventions are international mobile roaming (2006), mobile
network sharing agreements in the UK and Germany (both in 2003) and the abuse-of-
dominance decision against Telefonica in 2007.
The EC controls mainly three alternative instruments to intervene on national and
international market situations: First, the EC could intervenes on issues present in
multiple EU markets or affecting multiple member states at the same time addressing
national governments and national regulatory authorities (NRAs) (the international-
mobile-roaming example). Second, if an existing national regulatory approach favors
one company over its competitors the EC addresses the national regulatory practice
(the mobile-network-sharing examples). Finally, the EC also intervenes on individual
companies. In contrast to the others, this last type is a direct intervention in companies’
market practices (the abuse-of-dominance example).
In this paper I compare the market outcomes of the three types of EC interventions. As
regulatory adjustments try to accomplish a long-term change in the market situation in
the direction of more competition one can hardly disentangle the impact of a particular
regulatory change from other driving market forces. As one cannot evaluate the out-
comes of regulation employing standard econometric IO methodologies, I use an event
study approach which measures the direct impact of a regulatory announcement on the
change in a company’s stock prices. In doing so, I find significantly positive effects of
the first two types of interventions (addressing multiple member states and individual
governments) which show that EC interventions improve individual market situations.
On the other hand, directly addressing companies has a negative impact on the affected
companies (as expected) but has no significant positive impact on competitors in the
same market. While stock price volatilities are not significantly affected by the first
two types of interventions, the company-addressing type results in significantly lower
volatilities which means a more directed reaction across shareholders.
These findings let us draw key conclusions for telecom regulation in the EU: First, EC
interventions actually drive markets to a state of more competition and compensates
for an a priori inferior position of new entrants. Second, comparing the individual ap-
proaches the second and the third type of interventions are (partially) substitutable.
In particular, the comparison of stock price volatilities after announcements shows that
the national implementation step in line with the second type introduces additional un-
certainty about the final outcome as national governments and regulators adjust EC
interventions to the national situation. Thus, if both types of interventions are feasible
to reach a desirable adjustment in the market situation directly addressing a company
results reduces uncertainty of market participants which is of particular interest in mar-
kets with complex infrastructure investments.
Das Wichtigste in Kürze
Die Regulierung des Telekommunikationssektor folgt in der Europäischen Union (EU)
einem zweistufigen System, bei dem zunächst das Europäische Parlament gemeinsam mit
der Europäischen Kommission und den Regierungen der Mitgliedsstaaten das gemein-
same Regulierungssystem vorgeben, welches auf nationaler Ebene umzusetzen ist. Zusätz-
lich kann die Kommission auch direkt in das Marktgeschehen eingreifen, wenn sie eine
nationale oder internationale Marktsituation als unzureichend vor dem Hintergrund der
gemeinsamen Vorgaben erachtet. Bekannte Beispiele für solche Interventionen sind die
internationale Mobilfunk-Roaming-Vereinbarung (2006), die gemeinsame Netznutzung
unterschiedlicher Mobilfunkanbieter in Großbritannien und Deutschland (beide 2003)
und der Missbrauch einer dominanten Marktposition durch Telefonica (2007).
Der Kommission stehen drei unterschiedliche Instrumente zur Intervention zur Verfü-
gung: Erstens kann sie nationale Regierungen und Regulierungsbehörden bei Problemen
auf internationaler Ebene (bspw. die internationale Mobilfunk-Roaming-Vereinbarung)
adressieren. Zweitens greift die Kommission in nationale Märkte ein, wenn ein na-
tionaler Regulierungsansatz einzelne Unternehmen begünstigt (bspw. die gemeinsame
Netznutzung unterschiedlicher Mobilfunkanbieter). Drittens interveniert die Kommis-
sion auch gegen einzelne Unternehmen (das Marktmissbrauch-Beispiel).
In diesem Papier vergleiche ich die Ergebnisse der drei unterschiedlichen Interventions-
arten. Da Anpassungen von Regulierungsmaßnahmen eine langfristige Veränderung
der Marktsituation zu mehr Wettbewerb herbeiführen wollen, kann man nur schwer
das Ergebnis der Regulierungsanpassung von weiteren langfristig marktbeeinflussenden
Faktoren isolieren. Klassische ökonometrische Verfahren der Industrieökonomik kön-
nen zur Evaluation von Regulierungsentscheidungen daher nur bedingt herangezogen
werden. Um dieser Herausforderung begegnen zu können, verwende ich eine Ereignis-
studie, die den direkten Effekt von Regulierungsankündigungen durch die Veränderung
der Aktienkurse der betroffenen Unternehmen misst. Es ergeben sich signifikant posi-
tive Effekte der ersten beiden Interventionsansätze (bei denen mehrere Mitgliedsstaaten
oder einzelne nationale Märkte adressiert werden), die zeigen, dass Eigentümer der be-
troffenen Unternehmen durch die Interventionen eine Verbesserung der Marktsituation
erwarten. Im Gegensatz dazu hat die Intervention gegen einzelne Unternehmen einen
negativen Einfluss auf deren Aktienkurse aber keinen auf Wettbewerber im gleichen
Markt. Während Aktienkursvolatilitäten nicht signifikant durch die ersten beiden In-
terventionsarten verändert werden, führt die letzte zu einer signifikanten Reduktion der
Volatilität, was auf eine gleichgerichtetere Reaktion der Aktionäre hindeutet.
Aus diesen Ergebnissen lassen sich zentrale Schlussfolgerungen für die europäische Regu-
lierungspraxis ableiten: Kommissionsentscheidungen kompensieren neu eingetretene
Wettbewerber für eine zunächst schlechtere Ausgangsposition gegenüber etablierten An-
bietern. Vergleicht man die einzelnen Ansätze, so verfolgen gerade der zweite und der
dritte (teilweise) identische Ziele. Die Betrachtung der Aktienkursvolatilitäten nach
einer Ankündigung zeigt, dass die Stufe der nationalen Anpassung bei der zweiten In-
terventionsart zu einer zusätzlichen Unsicherheit über deren nationale Umsetzung für
Marktteilnehmer führt, da nationale Regierungen und Regulierer Einfluss nehmen. In
Fällen, in denen beide Ansätze anwendbar sind, zeigen daher die Schätzergebnisse, dass
der dritte Ansatz dem zweiten vorgezogen werden sollte.
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1 Introduction
Regulation intends to change the behavior of companies with significant market power
(SMP) to enforce market competition or to move a market to a state of higher efficiency.
Affected companies react to regulatory changes and adjust their market-related strate-
gies. Due to their adjustment in strategies, additionally, expected future profits and,
thus, companies’ net present values change.
In the European Union (EU), telecommunication regulation is a two-stage scheme; on
the higher stage, the EU Parliament in cooperation with the European Commission
(EC) and EU member states determines the common regulation scheme which, subse-
quently, has to be transposed to national laws, taking into account country specificities.
While these long-term guidelines join into so-called Regulatory Packages which provide
the framework to harmonize regulation across member states, the EC uses various reg-
ulatory measures to foster market competition and efficiency. These measures could be
categorized into three classes depending on the addressees, cross-market interventions,
country-addressing interventions and company-specific interventions.
Cross-market interventions refer to regulatory instruments which affect a particular mar-
ket type in all member states. In contrast to Regulatory Packages, cross-market inter-
ventions relate to a distinct issue in a market which expectedly hampers upcoming
competition or efficiency and which exists across all national markets (e.g. Regulation
2887/EC on local loop competition). Country-addressing interventions differ from cross-
market interventions as they pick up an issue which is found only in one national market
(EC (1997)). This might either arise from an governmentally accepted dominance of
one company or it might stem from insufficient transposition of regulatory guidelines.
While these two types of EC interventions require the implementation to national laws
by national governments and their adoption to markets by national regulators (NRAs),
the EC also directly intervenes if it suspects a company to abuse its dominant position
in a particular market (Articles 81 and 82, 87 and Regulation 134/2004 EC)(company-
specific interventions). In this paper, I analyze the expected outcomes of alternative
announcements and compare the results of the different types of interventions to each
other.
At the point in time when a regulatory announcement is published, it does not directly
lead to a change in market structures or companies’ behavior. However, owners of af-
fected companies react to these publications, either taking into account forthcoming
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transpositions to national law or other changes in the competition of the addressed mar-
kets. Under the assumption of rational shareholders, stock price reactions have been
used multiply as a proxy for market reactions on announcements.1 The consideration of
how an announcement changes shareholders’ expectations is based on the deviation of
stock price returns from a known path. This deviation is assumed to be a linear trans-
formation of a representative firm owner’s expectation about how a shock affects future
cash-flows. Thus, one can directly "measure" the monetary effect of an unexpected event
by considering stock prices.
What is heavily criticized with the so-called event-study methodology is, first, that
stock prices follow an autoregressive process (Salinger (1992)) and, second, that signifi-
cant shocks are accompanied by changes in stock price volatility, in particular when the
effect of an announcement is unclear (MacKinlay (1997), Lütkepohl (2006)). Both of
these criticisms cannot be taken into account with the traditional event study approach
which only focusses on current returns but ignores the time structure and the volatility
of returns.2 For considering the impact on volatility it is recommended to use two-step
methods which modulate the error term structure of the return estimation as an autore-
gressive process.
Two-step AR-ARCH-/GARCH-models enable the successive consideration of a shock on
returns and on volatility. While, usually, the lag structure is assumed to be exogenously
given for the return and for the volatility estimations, I select the optimal lag length
based on an iterative estimation approach.
The following results can be drawn from the estimations: First, cross-market interven-
tions and country-related interventions increase the stock-price returns of the affected
companies. Secondly, company-addressing actions reduce the stock price returns of the
company and, simultaneously, reduce the volatility in returns. In contrast, other com-
panies in the same market remain unaffected. These findings provide evidence that
regulatory interventions and changes in the regulation structure fulfil the aims of the
EU Parliament. Moreover, if a particular company is addressed, the effect on expected
future profits does not significantly differ from cross-market- or company-related inter-
ventions, but stock price volatility is reduced. As a result, regulatory interventions are
interpreted differently depending on the type of intervention.
1Schwert (1981) provides a broad overview over studies, including also regulation studies. After 2000,
stock price reactions have been used also comprehensively in the context of telecommunications as
will be discussed below.
2A detailed discussion is given in the introduction to the chapter "Nonlinearities in Financial Data"
in Campbell et al. (1997).
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an overview
over findings in the related literature. Afterwards, the alternative types of interventions
by the European Commission are specified in more detail and related hypotheses are
derived (Section 3). Section 4 explains how pre-estimations are implemented. Subse-
quently, a descriptive overview over the employed variables is given and the estimation
results of the pre-estimations are summarized and discussed. Moreover, a descriptive
overview over the variables of the main estimations is provided (Section 5). Section 6
discusses the estimation results. The last section summarizes the key findings, concludes
the paper and gives an outlook to further research.
2 Literature Review
This section considers the existing literature on company and market regulation and its
impact on the value of affected companies. As an ongoing discussion of methodological
improvements is in place for the event study approach, I start with a broader overview.
Event studies were originally used to consider regulatory changes in financial markets.
Examples are Stigler (1961) or Officer (1973), who both analyze the 1934 introduction
of the Securities Act and the establishment of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) and how NYSE stock prices reacted to this introduction of regulation. As the
SEC provides guidelines on stock exchanges, it directly addresses the shareholders’ be-
havior influencing shareholders’ evaluation of companies.
Schwert (1981) proposes alternative ways, how event studies could also be used in a
broader context of regulation, not only to measure the impact on the addressees but to
gain information about the expected reactions of addressees. Thus, event studies are
also adopted to non-financial markets; this opens a broader range for the implementation
of the event study methodology. Considering a change in the structure of non-financial
markets differs from considering changes in financial market structures in the sense that
a regulation does not address shareholders’ behavior but the strategic behavior of the
related company by assuming rational behavior of agents.3
Binder (1985) focuses on alternative weaknesses of event studies. Among others, he high-
lights the importance of the correct announcement date. By assuming the announcement
date to be a priori unknown, he finds only little evidence for stock price reactions on
3E.g. in the context of telecommunications, Schwert proposes to adopt event study-based measures to
evaluate frequency licenses.
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regulation. Following his argumentation, uncertainty of the first announcement date
strongly weakens the validity of an event study analysis. However, with the upcoming
internet and the online availability of information, news are offered simultaneously to a
larger group of interested parties. Thus, announcements should have a stronger effect on
share values. Moreover, the online storage of information also enables a detailed back-
tracing of information, which makes it easier to find the most relevant announcements
for event study analyses. As a consequence, a larger range of studies on single events or
event groups have been implemented after around 1995/1996.
While the previous papers provide an overview of the steps of adopting the event study
methodology to economic regulation analyses, the following studies focus on the imple-
mentation of event studies in the context of telecommunication markets.4
Considering the development of Deutsche Telekom stock prices, Rudolph and Johan-
ning (2004) compare the announcement of changes in regulation with announcements
of management decisions. They choose the period between 1997, i.e. shortly after the
IPO of Deutsche Telekom, and 2002. Thus, Rudolph and Johanning’s work covers a
period of comprehensive changes in the company culture from a former public monop-
olist to a more privately-owned company5, and, simultaneously, the transition period
from monopoly to regulated competition in the German telecommunication sector. The
authors show that management decisions have a significantly stronger effect on stock
prices than regulatory decisions, both being mostly negative in the period under con-
sideration. Ehrmann et al. (2005) extend the analysis of Rudolph and Johanning by
adopting additional news until March 2005. While the latter find significantly positive
stock price reactions before 2001, their results turn negative for the second half of the
observation period.
Bel and Trillas (2005) use the event study approach to gain more insights into the in-
terplay of governmental ownership, regulation and company activities in a study on the
Spanish incumbent Telefonica. Regulatory changes between 1996 and 2000 altered not
4Despite knowing of the pitfalls of event studies in the context of antitrust and the evaluation of
mergers and acquisitions (see e.g. McAfee and Williams, 1988; Shleifer and Vishni, 2003), the
event study methodology is a commonly accepted method in competition economics (Whinston,
2006). It has been used for the evaluation of alternative topics which comprise among others
anticompetitive horizontal mergers (Eckbo, 1983; Stillman, 1983; Eckbo and Wier, 1985) or the
evaluation of antitrust decisions and merger control (Duso et al., 2008; Neven and Zenger, 2010).
5The German state held 61 percent of Deutsche Telekom shares in 1997 and reduced its participation
to 42.8 percent by 2002.
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only the market structure but had an effect on the internal structure of Telefonica (see
also Kole and Lehn, 1997). In particular, Bel and Trillas consider the following agency
problem: The state keeps a Golden Share in Telefonica, thus, preventing the company’s
takeover. In contrast, no powerful shareholders exist which build a counterpart to the
government. The authors expect that in this protectory situation, management decisions
are strongly affected by the government. In line with Ehrmann et al. (2005), Bel and
Trillas find regulation to have a significantly positive impact on stock price returns for
the period until 2000. With regard to liberalization, the authors argue that a positive
impact on shareholder value stems from the expectations about an increase in demand.
Instead of considering the effect of regulation on the incumbent provider, Krouse and
Park (2003) use a broader data set covering both incumbents and new entrants on the
local exchange level and consider how the introduction of the 1996 Telecommunications
Act in the United States changed net present values of affected companies. They find
no significant impact of the announcement on the incumbents’ stock prices but signif-
icantly positive excess returns on competitors’ stock prices. Krouse and Park argue
that this result is strongly in line with the intention of this new legal framework as the
introduction of competition reduces market concentration in favor of the entrants, thus
enhancing competition in local telecommunication markets. In a quite similar approach,
Bittlingmayer and Hazlett (2002) analyze the effect of changes in regulation on American
broadband companies and find that deregulation decisions increase shareholder values.
Approvals on the deregulation of long distance markets have no significant effect on in-
ternet providers’ stock prices whereas denials negatively affect stock prices.
In contrast to most of the previous studies, I use data for multiple companies active
in multiple countries and markets. In doing so, I consider the impact of regulation an-
nouncements for incumbent and entrant providers. I focus on regulation announcements
of the EC which are less susceptible to a potential endogeneity challenge as characterized
e.g. in Duso and Röller (2003) or in Bel and Trillas (2005). The EC can choose from a
set of various regulatory instruments, which provoke alternative reactions. In the next
section, I provide an overview of the types of interventions and their expected impact
on affected companies.
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3 Regulation in Europe
Regulation in the EU is based on a two-stage approach, in which the Commission coor-
dinates, monitors and controls common steps of regulation across all EU member states.
One key instrument are Regulatory Packages with which the EU Parliament in cooper-
ation with national governments and the Commission offers a common set of directives
to harmonize the steps from monopoly to competition in the EU member states. The
member states have to adopt these guidelines to national laws taking into account coun-
try distinctions.6
However, during implementation processes, problems become obvious which mainly arise
due to technological innovations and market developments. In consequence, the Com-
mission adopts multiple steps to remedy these specific problems of the transposition
process and unexpected market developments (e.g. local loop access regulation or the
repeated interventions in line with Golden Shares). While these steps ease the process
of the installation of competition and efficiency, they do not directly address particular
national market issues. In contrast to national regulators, the Commission takes a supe-
rior position: It monitors markets from a cross-national perspective and intervenes if it
suspects national markets and rules not to satisfy the European regulatory requirements.
One commonly known example is the decision on international mobile communication
roaming.7 Following the Commission, both approaches support companies as a whole as
they reduce bureaucratic challenges, give a more reliable framework for NRAs’ actions
and reduce market barriers.
With its interventions, the Commission seeks to improve competition and efficiency in a
6While the First Regulatory Package of 1998 has been installed to coordinate a harmonized move from
monopolistic to competitive markets, this move rapidly turned to an acceleration of technological
and demand evolution. Therefore, the Second Regulatory Package was adopted in 2002/2003, which
seeks to balance static and dynamic regulation aims, i.e. competition aims as well as investment and
innovation aims. A detailed discussion is provided in the initial proposition for the new regulatory
framework by the Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/topics/telecoms/
regulatory/new_rf/documents/com2000-393en.pdf. In line with the 2006 market review of the
Second Regulatory Package, new guidelines were discussed which even stronger take into account
customers’ behavior in line with the development of Web 2.0. http://ec.europa.eu/information_
society/policy/ecomm/tomorrow/roadmap/index_en.htm.
7The Commission ordered mobile network providers (MNPs) to reduce termination rates stepwise
to a predetermined level and, beginning in March 2007, reduced the upper bound wholesale price
using cross-market regulation for all EU member states. More information is provided in the latest
regulatory intervention in this context: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?
uri=OJ:L:2009:167:0012:0023:EN:PDF. Additional information about the tariff structure can be
found here: http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/07/251
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market under scrutiny either tackling problems in line with the introduction of a Regula-
tory Package or technological deployments or in the consequence of an identified market
difficulty. As the intervention intends to improve the market situation, this should also
increase the firm value of the companies in the addressed market situation as a whole.
H1 (Type 1: Cross-market interventions): The Commission’s activities
to introduce and establish competition and more efficiency in the telecommu-
nication sector positively affect the situation of telecommunication companies
as a whole.
Besides cross-national steps of interventions, the Commission’s services also monitor
individual national markets as do national regulators. However, they base their con-
sideration on common European requirements and analyze whether individual national
regulation is in line with European guidelines. This Commission initiative is accompa-
nied by regular queries on the implementation of the guidelines and also by queries on
national regulators’ market monitorings. If they identify a national telecommunication
law or its regulatory implementation not to be in line with European requirements, the
Commission intervenes by addressing its concerns to the national authorities in charge.
Subsequently, the national government has to remedy its telecommunication law or the
NRA has to adjust its market implementation. If national institutions refrain from such
a step, the Commission brings the case to the European Court of Justice. An example
of such a far-reaching decision has been the intervention in line with regulatory holidays
in the context of the German VDSL roll-out.8 After the Commission has multiply re-
marked its concerns without amendments by the German government, it brought the
case to the European Court of Justice in June 2007. The case was decided in December
2009 impeding the German intention.9
If the Commission intervenes on a particular issue in a national market it suspects the
previous situation not to be in a stage of adequate competition and not to turn to compe-
tition in the near future under the current national telecommunication rules (Monopolies
Commission, 2009). Interventions therefore intend to improve the market situation and,
thus, the situation of the market players as a whole.10 As asymmetric national market
8The German government wanted to change national telecommunication law to enable regulatory
holidays for the establishment of new high-speed internet access if the national regulator Bun-
desnetzagentur would have decided VDSL to be a new market.
9http://www.euractiv.com/en/infosociety/eu-court-sets-precedent-germany-telecoms
-ruling/article-188017
10Please see also Bel and Trillas (2005) with regard to regulators’ decisions concerning total markets.
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boundaries are reduced and more transparency is provided, companies in the addressed
market should benefit from the Commission’s action, which increases their firm values.
H2 (Type 2: Country-addressing interventions): Shareholders expect a
positive impact of market-structural Commission interventions on firm values.
While the activities described so far concern issues which comprise markets as a whole,
the Commission also intervenes if it suspects individual market participants to hamper
competition. Similar to country-addressing interventions, it first informs the company
about its concerns. Afterwards, it warns the company and brings the case to the Eu-
ropean Court of Justice if the company does not adjust its behavior in line with the
recommendation. Multiple examples exist in which mainly former monopolists have
been part of such a process, e.g. KPN for abusing its dominant position for mobile call
termination in 2002 or France Telecom to pay back state aid in 2004. There are also
cases in which market entrants are suspected to be in an anti-competitive position such
as the state aid decision on Mobilcom in 2003.
Moreover, the Commission is obliged to consider cases of major players’ mergers, de-
mergers and acquisitions, including infrastructure sharing between providers or common
licence acquisitions. It intervenes or accepts a project imposing conditions if it suspects
subsequent market concentration to hamper competitors. Examples are the merger of
the two Scandinavian incumbents Telia and Sonera in 2002 or the 3G mobile network
sharing agreement in the UK in 2003. As in general most of the companies face trials
concerning forms of anti-competitive behavior or the prohibition of a future supremacy,
this type of intervention should have a negative impact on the value of the respective
firms.11
11Please note that company-addressing actions are a gray area between regulation and antitrust actions
particularly in markets with an ex-ante dominant provider. Rey (2002) identifies four criteria how
to distinguish regulation from antitrust issues. These are, first, procedures and control rights in the
sense that regulatory authorities have more powerful instruments to intervene on firm behavior than
antitrust authorities, second, timing of oversight, which means the issue of ex ante interventions
(typically regulation) and ex post interventions (typically antitrust), thirdly, information intensive-
ness and continued relationship meaning that regulators have to cultivate a continuous relationship
to the market and the companies, and, finally, relationship to political powers comprising the impact
of politicians on the agency. While individual NRAs actively take over antitrust tasks, such as the
UK regulator OFCOM, current regulation habits in the preparation of the Third Regulatory Pack-
age try to increase regulators’ independence from political authorities and also, to some extent, the
proximity of regulators to markets. In the further analysis, I consider cases of individual company-
specific interventions from the regulatory perspective keeping in mind the ongoing transition from
pure regulation to antitrust actions of the Commission in the telecommunication sector. In addition,
please see also Knieps (2003), Neumann (2003) and Vogelsang (2003).
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H3 (Type 3: Company-specific interventions): Company-specific inter-
ventions reduce the shareholder value of the addressed firms.
Figure 1: Overview of Alternative Types of Regulatory Interventions
European Parliament/
European Commission
Regulatory Requirements Type-1 and Type-2
Interventions
National Governments/
National Regulators
Regulation
Type-3
Interventions
National/International Affected
Regulation
Markets Companies
The first and the second hypotheses concern interventions, which relate to the telecom-
munication sector as a whole or to a particular market whereas the third hypothesis
focuses on individual companies’ actions (see also Figure 1). While the first two types
of interventions require national institutions to adopt and apply regulation measures to
national markets, the third approach directly addresses particular companies’ behavior
in the markets. Thus, from the first two types of interventions to the third type, the
Commission’s actions turn from a superior cross-national or national level of interest to
a firm-specific one. As actions are much more focussed with type-3 interventions they
should also receive more attention by shareholders.
H4a: The impact of interventions on stock price returns increases from cross-
market and country interventions to individual company requirements in ab-
solute terms.
Type-1 and type-2 interventions require the adoption of regulations to national laws tak-
ing into account national distinctions. Even with the knowledge of forthcoming interven-
tions, the actual market implementation has an ex ante unknown outcome. Therefore,
stock price volatilities should be higher with type-1 and type-2 interventions than with
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type-3 interventions as intermediate authorities provide additional uncertainty about
the actual implementation of outstanding regulatory requirements.
H4b: Stock-price volatilities decrease from cross-market and country inter-
ventions to individual company requirements.
4 Empirical Implementation
In the event study literature, two approaches for explaining shocks exist, which either
focus on stock price returns or on volatilities. For analyzing both returns and volatilities,
it is necessary to decompose one effect from the other. A common approach is the AR-
GARCH model (Autoregressive-Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedas-
ticity model) (Ferenstein and Gasowski, 2004; Lütkepohl, 2006). In AR-GARCH models,
the stock price return path is estimated using the standard AR approach and assuming
a GARCH process for the error term structure. I employ the AR-GARCH model to
estimate the stock price returns development for the companies under scrutiny assum-
ing a total observation window of 201 days around the event (100 days before and 100
days after the event). The lag-structure of the AR and the GARCH process are deter-
mined by iteration as described below. In contrast, in standard event studies, either no
autocorrelation or a one-period lag structure for stock price returns is assumed. These
approaches are special cases of the approach which I adopt here as I allow the model to
calibrate to the optimal time structure.
I employ the following three-step estimation approach: I first estimate stock price returns
for the 201-days observation window for each event. Afterwards, I estimate the error
term structure to get information about the return volatilities. For each observation
window, each of the two steps is iterated until the best estimator is found. The selection
of the best estimator is based on the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) as described in
Lütkepohl (2006) and as used in a magnitude of time series prediction studies.12 Finally,
I use the results of the first two steps to consider the effect of events in windows with
three alternative lengths around the event date (3, 7 and 11 days).
12In a previous version of this paper, I have double-checked results using the Bayes/Schwartz Informa-
tion Criterion for the AR process and for the GARCH process. This method dedicates more weight
to the number of explanatory variables. Nevertheless, results with regard to lag-length change only
slightly.
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For the first two steps, I assume the following return and error term equations:13
Rit = αRi +
∑j<t
j=0 βit−jRit−j + βTITIt + εit
εit = σitνit
(1)
Rit is the stock price return of firm i in period t and TIt corresponds to the returns of a
market index at date t. νit is white noise following an iid(0,1) process. The first equation
corresponds to the standard AR-part of an AR-GARCH model. With the GARCH
assumptions, the error term of the return equation satisfies the second equation and σit
is determined by the following process (Bollerslev, 1986):
σ2it = ασi +
P<t∑
p=0
βεit−pε2it−p +
Q<t∑
q=0
βσit−qV ar(σ2it−q) (2)
with V ar(εit|εit−1, εit−2, ...) = σ2it, E(εit) = 0, Cov(εit, εis) = 0, t 6= s. When all βσi’s
equal zero, the process is an ARCH model as described in Engle (1982).14
In contrast to other event study approaches which postulate a specific lag length, the
approach chosen here keeps the estimation flexible in the sense that each estimation is
multiply repeated employing the ARCH or the GARCH restrictions to determine the
optimal lag-length based on the AIC.
In the third step, I focus on the individual event window and analyze if and how an event
causes a deviation from the expected returns and the volatilities process. Abnormal
returns (AR) and abnormal volatilities (AV ) are assumed to be normally iid with zero
means over the observation period but not necessarily in the event window. Therefore,
abnormal returns and abnormal volatilities are given by the following equations:
ARmid = R
m
id − Rˆmid
AV mid = σ
m2
id − σˆm2id
(3)
m marks the event, i the firm and d the date of the observation. Rˆmid and σˆm2id are the
estimates of equations (1) and (2) for each event. Daily abnormal returns and volatilities
are cumulated around the event day to obtain the cumulated abnormal returns and the
cumulated abnormal volatilities with
13The event index is neglected as long as the consideration of a single event is sufficient.
14For more details, please see e.g. Campbell et al. (1997).
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CARmi =
∑2τ+1ARmiτ
CAV mi =
∑2τ+1AV miτ (4)
I compare the results of three alternative event windows with a length of three, seven
and eleven days before and after the event (τ = 3, 7, 11).
I use alternative exogenous variables, which explain cumulative abnormal returns and
volatilities:
CARmi = α
m,r + expl. var.′βm,rexpl,i + control var.
′βm,rcontr,i + η
m,r
i
CAV mi = α
m,v + expl. var.′βm,vexpl,i + control var.
′βm,vcontr,i + η
m,v
i
(5)
Exogenous variables are classified in explanatory variables expl. var., which are cross-
market, addressed-country and addressed-company dummies, and control variables
control var., which are fix-line, mobile, incumbent, foreign fix-line and foreign mobile
and combinations of these variables.
Although the AR-GARCH approach improves the estimate of stock price return develop-
ments, it still has some pitfalls known from the standard approach. In particular, it as-
sumes the independence of stock price returns at the same point in time, corr(Rit, Rjt) =
0, and across different series across time, corr(Rit, Rjs) = 0, ∀i 6= j, s 6= t. Multivari-
ate GARCH models exist which adjust the variance-covariance matrix to take stronger
into account cross-sectional correlations by simultaneously estimating returns of multi-
ple companies. However, these approaches are only implemented in studies with a low
number of companies due to the exponential growth of processing capacity requirements
in the number of considered companies and the lag-length employed (Lütkepohl, 2006).
Because of the high number of companies in my sample, I refrain from these multivari-
ate AR-GARCH models and follow the standard approach by adding market indices to
the model to control the cross-company structure at least partially. Nevertheless, this
approach cannot completely absorb cross-company correlations.
5 Data and Pre-Estimations
5.1 Data Description
To test the hypotheses, I use information on Commission decisions, which were selected
for the time period between January 1, 2000 and December 31, 2008. Announcements,
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not actual decisions, are employed as it is explained in the literature that the first an-
nouncement of a significant change should affect stock prices as soon as it is available
(Binder, 1985). The information is taken from the database Cullen International, which
collects per-day information on changes in telecommunication regulation and competi-
tion. The selected news are displayed in Table 8 in the appendix.
Thomson Financial Datastream provides share values for about 90 companies char-
acterized as telecommunication companies in the selected countries, which are EU-15
countries as well as Norway and Switzerland during the observation period. From this
schedule, five companies had to be excluded because they are listed after mid 2006 and,
thus, might be stronger affected by the firm-specific value-finding processes of the mar-
ket. Subsequently, I re-examined the remaining companies by collecting information
about firm activities from their websites. Additional companies were excluded from the
sample as either the companies are not active in the field of interest, i.e. fix-line or mo-
bile telecommunications, or as not enough stock price data points are available for the
observation period.
After these corrections, I ended up with 2447 independent event-company combinations
whereof 816 are combinations with incumbents. 32 events concern cross-market related
issues, 6 events concern country-related topics and 26 events concern company-related
announcements. There exists an over-representation of incumbent-events in particular
in the first years of the sample as most incumbents have been listed over the whole
observation period.15 Some companies are active both in fix-line and mobile markets in
multiple countries. However, no or only little information could be collected on their
activities in these countries and markets. What would be most interesting are market
shares and sales ratios. Nevertheless, the only information, which is available from com-
pany websites and information systems, is the particular market, i.e. either fix-line or
mobile markets, and the year of entry and exit. Furthermore, information about the
regional reach is obtained, i.e. whether a company is active in Europe or globally. Infor-
mation about multi-market activities is collected from alternative information sources
including Bureau van Dijk’s Amadeus database and the companies’ websites.
I employ two alternative market indices, the Dow Jones 600 Telecommunications Index
Europe (Telecom Index) and the Dow Jones 600 Technology Index Europe (Technol-
15Exceptions are Telia Sonera, listed since June 14, 2000, Telekom Austria, listed since November 21,
2000, Telenor, listed since December 05, 2000, and Belgacom, listed since March 22, 2004.
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ogy Index). The first includes major European telecommunication companies meaning
also some of the companies under scrutiny of the analysis. Therefore, a spurious cor-
relation challenge might exist in particular when analyzing the impact of cross-market
announcements. For these events, the impact on returns is probably mainly explained by
the change of the index. Additionally, regulation announcements potentially also affect
other companies of the index (see Rudolph and Johanning, 2004). Therefore, the actual
effect might be downward-deterred in absolute values both for returns and for volatilities.
To control for this issue, the Technology Index is used as it excludes any telecommunica-
tion companies but covers companies from sectors which perform very similarly over the
sample period. Some minor endogeneity might still exist as the products and services
of technology companies mainly depend on adequate telecommunication infrastructure
(such as software etc.). However, this challenge could be neglected.
Table 1: Mean Descriptive Statistics of the Variables of Steps 1 and 2
Mean(returns) -0.0018 0.0076 -0.0015 0.0038 -0.0019 0.0089
Std. Dev.(returns) 0.2996 0.1875 0.2298 0.0651 0.3346 0.2167
Mean(Telecom Index) -0.0002 0.0005 -0.0002 0.0005 -0.0002 0.0005
Std. Dev.(Telecom Index) 0.0073 0.0032 0.0076 0.0032 0.0071 0.0032
Mean(Technology Index) -0.0003 0.0007 -0.0003 0.0008 -0.0003 0.0007
Std. Dev.(Technology Index) 0.0094 0.0041 0.0099 0.0041 0.0092 0.0041
Obs.
Std. Dev.Mean
2447 816 1631
EntrantsPooled Incumbents
Std. Dev.MeanStd. Dev.Mean
The descriptive statistics of the variables used in the step-1 and step-2 estimations are
displayed in Table 1. Figures are mean variables in the sense that for each event, I
calculate the descriptive statistics of the observation window and aggregate results over
all events and all companies. The resulting mean values and the standard deviations of
the means are displayed here. returns is the daily relative change in stock prices, std.
dev.(returns) is the calculated mean standard deviation of returns, Telecom Index and
Technology Index variables are daily relative changes of the indices and, similarly, the
std. dev. terms correspond to the mean standard deviations of the index returns. By
comparing the pooled results with the incumbents’ and with the competitors’ results,
it is found that average returns are at a comparable level. However, average standard
deviations are much more volatile for competitors than for incumbents.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of the Dependent Variables
3 days Pooled Incumbents Entrants Fix-Line Mobile
CAR -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0001
(Telecom Index) (0.0076) (0.0048) (0.0087) (0.0076) (0.0076)
CAR -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0000
(Technology Index) (0.0076) (0.0048) (0.0087) (0.0076) (0.0076)
CAV 0.0010 0.0006 0.0011 0.0009 0.0010
(Telecom Index) (0.0013) (0.0005) (0.0015) (0.0013) (0.0013)
CAV 0.0010 0.0006 0.0012 0.0009 0.0010
(Technology Index) (0.0013) (0.0005) (0.0015) (0.0013) (0.0013)
7 days Pooled Incumbents Entrants Fix-Line Mobile
CAR -0.0013 -0.0015 -0.0012 -0.0028 -0.0007
(Telecom Index) (0.0270) (0.0179) (0.0306) (0.0272) (0.0266)
CAR -0.0009 -0.0015 -0.0006 -0.0021 -0.0003
(Technology Index) (0.0270) (0.0180) (0.0305) (0.0271) (0.0267)
CAV 0.0052 0.0031 0.0062 0.0051 0.0053
(Telecom Index) (0.0069) (0.0023) (0.0081) (0.0069) (0.0071)
CAV 0.0052 0.0031 0.0063 0.0052 0.0053
(Technology Index) (0.0069) (0.0023) (0.0081) (0.0069) (0.0071)
11 days Pooled Incumbents Entrants Fix-Line Mobile
CAR -0.0013 -0.0019 -0.0011 -0.0044 -0.0003
(Telecom Index) (0.0473) (0.0305) (0.0538) (0.0472) (0.0468)
CAR -0.0007 -0.0019 -0.0001 -0.0034 0.0003
(Technology Index) (0.0470) (0.0304) (0.0535) (0.0471) (0.0463)
CAV 0.0105 0.0063 0.0126 0.0104 0.0107
(Telecom Index) (0.0139) (0.0046) (0.0163) (0.0139) (0.0143)
CAV 0.0106 0.0063 0.0128 0.0105 0.0107
(Technology Index) (0.0138) (0.0045) (0.0162) (0.0139) (0.0141)
Note: Variables are means of the relevant category, std. dev. in brackets.
The descriptive statistics of step-3 dependent and explanatory variables are displayed in
Table 2 and in Table 3, respectively.
Table 2 shows only small cumulative abnormal returns and also volatilities around the
announcement dates. Following Rudolph and Johanning (2004), changes in European
regulations are probably of a minor interest for shareholders. This might be due to the
fact that the result of regulation is not directly linked to returns but is a long-run driver
of companies’ profits. Furthermore, low values could also stem from the estimation ap-
proach for predicted returns functions of step 1 and step 2. As the approach chosen
here is the result of an iterative estimation optimization, the results should meet stock
price evolutions much more appropriate than known standard techniques. Consequently,
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the deviation, which is identified around an event, is expected to be less extensive in
absolute terms but much more robust.
Means differ only slightly depending on the underlying indices. With a larger window
size, entrants CAR are lower when applying the Technology Index, which also affects
the pooled estimation outcome. However, estimation results for the incumbents esti-
mations and the consideration of CAV show nearly identical results. In consequence,
only little evidence is found for a potential spurious regression problem. With larger
event windows, a stronger reaction exists both for incumbents returns in comparison
to entrants returns and for fix-line operators returns in comparison to mobile operators
returns. The comparison of the three alternative event windows shows that the seven-
days window provides the largest deviation in returns. In contrast, cumulative abnormal
volatilities increase with the window size. Controlling for fix-line or mobile operators
leads to similar results.
With regard to volatilities, significant differences are only found between incumbent and
entrant providers: Entrants stock prices react much more volatile on announcements,
which might be due to the stronger heterogeneity in this group. In contrast, no signifi-
cant differences in volatilities exist between fix-line and mobile operators.
Let us next turn to Table 3. In 26.9 percent of company-event combinations, companies
are involved, which are active in both fix-line and mobile markets, in 26.4 percent only
fix-line and in 46.7 percent only mobile companies are involved. Due to double-markets
activities, fix-line and mobile means do not sum up to 1. On average, each fix-line
provider (mobile network provider) is active in 1.8 (1.4) European markets over the ob-
servation period. No provider in the sample has left one market and afterwards entered
another. About one third of the companies are incumbent providers in one country but
are also active in another country as a new entrant. These companies are counted only
once (as incumbents), as stock prices cannot be disentangled based on country-market
activities. One special case is Telia Sonera, which is the incumbent in Sweden and in Fin-
land after the companies merged in 2002. Less than 10 percent of fix-line and of mobile
providers are active in countries other than the EU-15 countries, Norway or Switzerland.
Dummies for regulation-addressed companies are used to separate addressed companies
from others in the same market.
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of the Explanatory Variables
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
fix-line 0.5333 0.4990 0 1
mobile 0.7360 0.4409 0 1
fix-line (multi-market activity) (1) 1.7941 2.5841 0 15
mobile (multi-market activity) (2) 1.4334 1.6973 0 9
incumbent (3) 0.3335 0.4715 0 1
foreign fix-line 0.0919 0.2890 0 1
foreign mobile 0.0826 0.2753 0 1
cross-market (4) 0.4843 0.4999 0 1
addressed market (5) 0.1606 0.3672 0 1
addressed company (5) 0.0090 0.0944 0 1
affected company fix-line 0.2795 0.4489 0 1
affected company mobile 0.3551 0.4787 0 1
1 x 4 0.8606 1.9723 0 15
2 x 4 0.6980 1.3932 0 9
4 x 5 0.0523 0.2227 0 1
4 x 6 0.0074 0.0855 0 1
5.2 Pre-Estimation Results
Table 4 provides pooled summary statistics and test results for the step-1 and the step-2
estimations.16 Estimations with the Technology Index have an, on average, lower opti-
mum lag length in all three specifications both for the AR and for the GARCH process.
Comparing the outcomes of the incumbents estimations and the entrants estimations,
the AR process is shorter for the entrants estimations but the (G)ARCH process is
longer, which is in line with the findings on cumulated abnormal returns (Table 2). The
Chi-square tests and also the Log-Likelihood tests are found to be weak instruments
to compare variable and estimation quality because of their broad volatility across the
alternative estimations.17
The standard approach used in the literature to proxy the actual stock price returns
process assumes no explicit time structure, which corresponds to ar = 0 and also p = 0
and q = 0. If the iteration provides a lag length variance of zero, q = 0, to be best
the ARCH model meets the underlying error term process better than the GARCH
model. However, this specification neither exists for the incumbents nor for the entrants
16Tables 10 and 11 in the appendix show the results separated for incumbents and entrants.
17Moreover, the Chi-square test is not a test to compare specifications of alternative estimations.
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Table 4: Summary Statistics and Test Results of the Iterative Estimation Process
Pooled
Mean 
(Std. Dev.)
Minimum
(Share Min.)
Maximum
(Share Max.)
Mean 
(Std. Dev.)
Minimum
(Share Min.)
Maximum
(Share Max.)
AR
lag ar 3.826 0 6 4.114 0 7
(1.675) (0.056) (0.193) (1.899) (0.048) (0.133)
Chi_sq (df) 76.6 (4.914) 0.000 1553.6 77.8 (5.122) 0.000 1561.1
(77.5) (77.0)
log likelihood 43.0 -347.6 830.1 44.3 -339.8 890.4
(200.3) (203.3)
(G)ARCH
lag error_sq (=p) 1.924 0 8 2.097 0 8
(2.152) (0.357) (0.017) (2.240) (0.340) (0.014)
lag sigma_sq (=q) 1.980 1 6 2.112 1 8
(1.688) (0.678) (0.095) (1.994) (0.675) (0.042)
Chi_sq (df) 35183 (1.886) 0.000 7014.8 306.2 (1.954) 0.000 617316
(1584476) (12898)
log likelihood 1320.5 -296.2 1191.8 57.8 -293.8 1289.4
(305.4) (212.7)
Telecom IndexTechnology Index
Note: lag sigma_sq = 0 corresponds to an ARCH process, whereas lag sigma_sq > 0
represents a GARCH process.
lag error_sq = 0 and lag sigma_sq = corresponds to the standard assumption of the usual
model.
models. Moreover, as the combination of lag ar = 0, p = 0 and q = 0 is found in no
estimation to be the best estimation approach, the AR-GARCH estimator with higher
lag lengths always meets the actual stock price development better. In consequence,
the pre-estimation results provide evidence that the iterating method is preferable to
standard approaches, in particular for the incumbents estimations.
6 Estimation Results and Discussion
After the very technical consideration of descriptive statistics and pre-estimation results,
let us now turn to the step-3 estimation results and their discussion. Results are pro-
vided for multiple estimation specifications starting with the less restricted estimations,
including all relevant dummies, subsequently, including additional country controls of
the affected companies and, finally, adding also interaction terms. In the appendix the
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results of estimations are provided separately for each event group (Tables 12 - 14). The
step-3 estimation results are based on heteroscedasticity-consistent GLS-estimations of
equations (5) (based on Huber-White-corrected variance-covariance matrices).
From the discussions in line with Hypothesis 1, a positive impact of type-1 interventions
should be expected as this type of interventions is implemented to increase competition
and market efficiency after the adoption of the Regulatory Packages is found to be in-
sufficient. The coefficients of cross-market interventions are significantly positive,
in particular with larger event windows and when controlling for country differences.
Due to the complexity of such regulatory adjustments, interested groups gain detailed
information prior to the date of the official implementation via rumors and leading an-
nouncements and actions. In consequence, the findings are in line with Binder (1985)
and Sallinger (1992) who both argue that stock prices already adjust before the actual
date of an official announcement. Concerning volatilities, no significant coefficients are
found. Only the interaction term with fix-line operators provides evidence for a signifi-
cantly higher volatility. Thus, the estimation results confirm Hypothesis 1 of a positive
impact of cross-market regulation on stock prices.
Following the second hypothesis, regulation addressing individual national mar-
kets should have a positive impact on stock prices. The Commission adopts this type of
actions suspecting a country’s regulation or behavior to favor particular companies. An
intervention is therefore implemented to reduce a potential deterrence, which should in-
crease producer surplus as a whole. The estimation results support this discussion as the
relevant coefficients are significantly positive in all estimations. From the selected news
(Table 8 in the appendix), it might be expected that country biases are mainly in favor
of the incumbents before regulation is introduced. In consequence, interventions reduce
the exceptional position of incumbents, which should have a negative impact on their
firm values. I introduce interaction terms for companies’ incumbency in a country to the
estimations to analyze this extensional aspect. However, the results in Table 7 show no
significant additional effect leading to the conclusion that the incumbents’ stock prices
react not significantly different from competitors’ stock prices. This finding is in line
with the analyses in Krouse and Park (2003) and Bel and Trillas (2005), who also iden-
tify positive or, at least, no significantly negative effects on incumbents’ stock prices due
to country-specific regulations. With regard to volatilities in stock prices, no significant
effect could be identified. Following Krouse and Park’s (2003) arguments, these results
support the expectations that Commission interventions approve the effectiveness of the
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Table 5: Estimation Results without Control Variables
cross-market 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0014 0.0002 -0.0000 0.0016
( 0.0003 ) ( 0.0012 ) ( 0.0021 ) ( 0.0003 ) ( 0.0012 ) ( 0.0021 )
addressed country 0.0012 ** 0.0032 * 0.0054 * 0.0012 ** 0.0030 * 0.0054 *
( 0.0005 ) ( 0.0018 ) ( 0.0031 ) ( 0.0005 ) ( 0.0018 ) ( 0.0031 )
addressed company -0.0018 * -0.0096 *** -0.0100 * -0.0019 * -0.0101 -0.0113 **
( 0.0010 ) ( 0.0031 ) ( 0.0053 ) ( 0.0010 ) ( 0.0029 ) ( 0.0052 )
fix-line 0.0001 -0.0018 -0.0050 ** -0.0000 -0.0024* -0.0063 ***
( 0.0004 ) ( 0.0013 ) ( 0.0023 ) ( 0.0004 ) (0.0013 ) ( 0.0023 )
mobile 0.0007 0.0017 0.0017 0.0006 0.0012 0.0008
( 0.0005 ) ( 0.0016 ) ( 0.0027 ) ( 0.0005 ) ( 0.0016 ) ( 0.0027 )
constant -0.0009 -0.0015 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0013 -0.0001
( 0.0005 ) ( 0.0020 ) ( 0.0034 ) ( 0.0005 ) ( 0.0020 ) ( 0.0034 )
# Observations
F-Test (df)
R2
cross-market -0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0006 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001
( 0.0001 ) ( 0.0003 ) ( 0.0006 ) (0.0001 ) ( 0.0003 ) ( 0.0006 )
addressed country -0.0000 -0.0003 -0.0007 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001
( 0.0001 ) ( 0.0004 ) ( 0.0008 ) ( 0.0001 ) ( 0.0004 ) ( 0.0008 )
addressed company -0.0006 *** -0.0033 *** -0.0065 *** -0.0005 *** -0.0028 *** -0.0054 ***
( 0.0001 ) (0.0004 ) ( 0.0007 ) ( 0.0001 ) ( 0.0004 ) ( 0.0007 )
fix-line -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0002 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0002
( 0.0001 ) ( 0.0004 ) ( 0.0007 ) ( 0.0001 ) ( 0.0003 ) ( 0.0007 )
mobile 0.0000 0.0001 0.0005 0.0000 0.0003 0.0009
( 0.0001 ) ( 0.0004 ) ( 0.0008 ) ( 0.0001 ) ( 0.0004 ) ( 0.0008 )
constant 0.0010 *** 0.0053 *** 0.0106 *** 0.0009 *** 0.0050 *** 0.0099 ***
( 0.0001 ) ( 0.0005 ) ( 0.0010 ) ( 0.0001 ) ( 0.0005 ) ( 0.0010 )
# Observations 2411 2411 2411
F-Test (df) 16.32 (5) 23.62 (5) 19.26
R2 0.0020 0.0021 0.0023
CAV (3) CAV (11)
14.27 (5)
0.0040 0.0055 0.0056 0.0040 0.0062 0.0076
0.0019 0.0019 0.0019
2431 2431
2.21 (5) 4.06 (5) 3.38 (5) 2.35 (5) 4.90 (5)
9.92 (5) 15.04 (5)
CAV (3) CAV (7) CAV (11)
2431
2411 2411 2437 2437 2437
2.21 (5)
CAV (7)
Technology Index Telecom Index
CAR (3) CAR (7) CAR (11) CAR (3) CAR (7) CAR (11)
2411
Note: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent significance level, standard
errors are displayed in brackets.
addressed markets, which outweighs the negative direct impact on incumbents.
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Table 6: Estimation Results with Control Variables
cross-market 0.0011 0.0111 * 0.0285 ** 0.0017 0.0118 * 0.0288 **
( 0.0014 ) ( 0.0063 ) ( 0.0117 ) ( 0.0014 ) ( 0.0062 ) ( 0.0117 )
addressed country 0.0014 *** 0.0037 * 0.0064 * 0.0013 ** 0.0030 0.0054 *
(0.0005 ) ( 0.0020 ) ( 0.0035 ) ( 0.0005 ) ( 0.0020 ) ( 0.0034 )
addressed company -0.0018 * -0.0097 *** -0.0099 ** -0.0019 * -0.0103 *** -0.0112 **
( 0.0011 ) ( 0.0030 ) ( 0.0046 ) ( 0.0011 ) ( 0.0028 ) ( 0.0045 )
incumbent 0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0007 0.0001 0.0004 0.0005
( 0.0003 ) ( 0.0010 ) ( 0.0018 ) ( 0.0003 ) ( 0.0010 ) ( 0.0018 )
fix-line 0.0001 -0.0019 -0.0047 * -0.0000 -0.0025 * -0.0060 **
( 0.0004 ) ( 0.0015 ) ( 0.0026 ) ( 0.0004 ) (0.0015 ) ( 0.0026 )
mobile 0.0007 0.0020 0.0021 0.0006 0.0015 0.0010
( 0.0005 ) ( 0.0016 ) ( 0.0028 ) ( 0.0005 ) ( 0.0016 ) ( 0.0028 )
foreign fix-line 0.0006 0.0025 0.0011 0.0008 0.0025 0.0011
( 0.0006 ) ( 0.0024 ) ( 0.0040 ) (0.0006 ) ( 0.0024 ) ( 0.0041 )
foreign mobile -0.0002 0.0008 0.0034 -0.0002 0.0009 0.0032
( 0.0005 ) ( 0.0019 ) ( 0.0034 ) ( 0.0005 ) ( 0.0018 ) ( 0.0033 )
constant -0.0020 -0.0015 -0.0285 ** -0.0008 -0.0138 ** -0.0282 **
( 0.0015 ) ( 0.0020 ) ( 0.0121 ) ( 0.0005 ) ( 0.0064 ) ( 0.0121 )
# Observations
F-Test (df)
R2
cross-market 0.0002 0.0006 0.0008 0.0003 0.0013 0.0020
( 0.0003 ) ( 0.0014 ) ( 0.0028 ) (0.0003 ) ( 0.0014 ) ( 0.0027 )
addressed country 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0000 0.0002 0.0004
( 0.0001 ) ( 0.0005 ) ( 0.0009 ) ( 0.0001 ) ( 0.0005 ) ( 0.0009 )
addressed company -0.0004 *** -0.0018 *** -0.0034 *** -0.0002 ** -0.0011 ** -0.0021 **
( 0.0001 ) (0.0004 ) ( 0.0009 ) ( 0.0001 ) ( 0.0005 ) ( 0.0010 )
incumbent -0.0006 *** -0.0032 *** -0.0065 *** -0.0006 *** -0.0032 *** -0.0065 ***
( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0002 ) ( 0.0005 ) ( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0002 ) ( 0.0005 )
fix-line 0.0000 0.0001 0.0004 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0003
( 0.0001 ) ( 0.0004 ) ( 0.0008 ) ( 0.0001 ) ( 0.0004 ) ( 0.0008 )
mobile 0.0000 0.0003 0.0009 0.0001 0.000 0.0014 *
( 0.0001 ) ( 0.0004 ) ( 0.0008 ) ( 0.0001 ) ( 0.0004 ) ( 0.0008 )
foreign fix-line 0.0004 *** 0.0021 *** 0.0043 *** 0.0005 *** 0.0026 *** 0.0051 ***
( 0.0001 ) ( 0.0006 ) ( 0.0012 ) ( 0.0001 ) ( 0.0006 ) ( 0.0012 )
foreign mobile -0.0002 ** -0.0015 *** -0.0030 *** -0.0003 *** -0.0020 *** -0.0042 ***
( 0.0001 ) ( 0.0005 ) ( 0.0009 ) ( 0.0001 ) ( 0.0004 ) ( 0.0008 )
constant 0.0009 *** 0.0052 *** 0.0107 *** 0.0008 *** 0.0044 *** 0.0093 ***
( 0.0003 ) ( 0.0015 ) ( 0.0030 ) ( 0.0003 ) ( 0.0015 ) ( 0.0029 )
# Observations
F-Test (df)
R2
country dummies included
country dummies included
0.0566 0.0067 0.0626 0.0607 0.0650 0.0663
13.19 (17) 14.45 (17) 14.79 (17) 12.31 (17) 13.53 (17) 13.80 (17)
2411 2411 2411 2431 2431
CAV (3) CAV (7) CAV (11) CAV (3) CAV (7) CAV (11)
2431
0.01490.0061 0.0124 0.0130 0.0061 0.0136
0.99 (17) 2.37 (17) 2.48 (17) 1.03 (17) 2.83 (17) 2.97 (17)
2411 2411 2411 2437 2437 2437
CAR (3)
Telecom IndexTechnology Index
CAR (7) CAR (3) CAR (7) CAR (11)CAR (11)
Note: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent significance level, standard
errors are displayed in brackets.
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.
Company-specific regulations have a significantly negative impact on stock price
returns. Moreover, including interaction terms with incumbency provides evidence that
the negative effect stems from the combination regulation-incumbency as the explanatory
power of the regulation term shifts to the interaction term. The reduction in volatility
in line with company-specific regulation underlines these findings. If an intervention
addresses single companies, shareholders’ interpretations of the action are more akin
leading to a significant reduction in stock price volatility. In alternative estimation ap-
proaches, I include dummies to consider the reactions of other companies in the market
of the addressed companies (see Table 14). From the previous discussions, a positive
externality on competitors should be expected if the SMP of one company in the same
market is reduced. However, the estimation results provide only weakly significant evi-
dence, if at all.
Following the discussion in line with Hypothesis 4, a stronger reaction in absolute
terms for company-related interventions should be expected than for cross-market and
country-addressing interventions. Moreover, volatilities in reactions should simultane-
ously be lower. The comparison of the relevant coefficients requires the consideration of
the difference in absolute values. If this difference is significantly positive or negative the
strength of the impacts differ from each other. Wald test results provide no evidence for
significant differences between type-3 intervention coefficients and the coefficients of the
other types of interventions for the returns estimations. In the volatility estimations,
company-addressing interventions result in a significantly lower reaction than indirected
interventions. Including interaction terms between country-addressing interventions and
incumbency provides similar results that firm owners expect no differences in the size
of the regulatory impacts on the affected companies dependent on the type. However,
their reactions are more akin with directed interventions. These results confirm the
argumentation in line with Hypothesis 4 only partially. By including an additional,
national administrative stage, regulation better meets national distinctions due to reg-
ulators’ proximity to markets under scrutiny. However, additionalinterested groups on
the national level react on regulatory announcements, which are, first, national govern-
ments and regulators and, second, also the addressed companies in the market as soon
as the announcement of a change in the market structure is available. In consequence,
at the point in time of the Commission’s regulatory announcement, companies do not
know the actual regulatory outcome, which will be finally implemented to the markets.
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This causes uncertainty, which is expressed by higher stock price volatilities. In contrast,
directly addressing individual companies excludes this intermediate stage, which reduces
regulatory uncertainty and the uncertainty about the final market outcome.
The comparison of the H2 estimation results and the H3 estimation results raises the
question whether affected companies discriminate between the type of interventions.
While no significant difference is identified in absolute values, Wald tests on the differ-
ence between the coefficients confirm the idea that companies discriminate. Thus, the
estimation results support Hypothesis 4, i.e. companies distinguish between indirected
regulation (cross-market-related regulation and country-related regulation) and directed
regulation (company-related regulation) with their adjustments of market strategies.
However, the strength of reactions does not differ between the types.
The consideration of the control variables provides little evidence for significant differ-
ences between fix-line activities, mobile or mixed activities. Mobile providers’ stock
price returns react in line with fix-line providers’ stock price returns, independently of
whether an event addresses a particular mobile or fix-line market. In contrast, a signifi-
cantly negative effect is found for fix-line companies only for the largest event window.
While no significant effect on returns exists for the cross-market - fix-line interaction
coefficients, a significant increase in volatility is found. Including dummies for foreign-
country activities results in an ambiguous picture: Fix-line providers’ stock prices are
more volatile. However, no such enhancement effect is found with multi-mobile market
activities. The volatility effect is even stronger when being active in more fix-line mar-
kets.18 Fix-line regulation has a much stronger impact on market outcomes than mobile
regulation, which could be due to the higher market concentration in fix-line markets.
In a nutshell, the findings confirm the idea that affected companies react differently
to regulatory interventions. While the Commission uses two alternative instruments to
affect the outcome of particular national markets – either by addressing the country,
i.e. the government or the regulator, or by addressing individual companies – company
reactions to these regulation announcements do not significantly differ. While market-
related actions shift the actual market implementation to the national administrative
stage and, thus, leave more room for national adjustments, directly addressing com-
panies excludes uncertainty stemming from national influences. However, stock-price
reactions prove that company-addressing interventions do not necessarily improve the
situation for competitors in the same market.
18Estimation results on multi-market activities are displayed in Table 12 in the appendix.
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7 Conclusion
This article considers how the value of companies is affected by announcements about
the adoption of alternative regulatory instruments by the Commission. Regulatory inter-
ventions are classified into three categories depending on the addressee. The first type of
interventions are cross-market approaches to build or change the common regulatory and
competition framework of all EU member states. The second type of interventions are
actions against particular country laws or habits if the Commission finds one company
or a group of companies to benefit from the national situation compared to competitors
due to the actual implementation of the EU regulatory guidelines. The last type of in-
terventions are actions against particular companies. Each of these interventions affects
the market structure or the behavior of individual companies, which changes companies’
expected future profits and, thus, their net present values.
By employing a modified event study approach, I have considered how these alternative
types of interventions are evaluated by the market. While the first two types, cross-
market and country-interventions, address markets as a whole, the last type directly
addresses individual companies. However, all approaches are implemented to enforce
competition and to increase efficiency. Cross-market- and country-related types of in-
terventions are found to have a significantly positive effect on stock price returns, which
is in line with the intention of the Commission. Similarly, a negative effect exists for
the last type as this kind of interventions is implemented to weaken an anti-competitive
advantage of the addressed company or group of companies. Nevertheless, no significant
differences in the size of the reactions is found between alternative types of interventions
but in the strength and the direction.
These results provide new insights into the intentions of European regulations and how
to employ regulatory instruments more effectively. With regard to particular national
market interventions, the Commission can choose between two instruments, which are
country-related interventions or company-related interventions. The market outcome
depends on the Commission’s suspicion whether national administrations implement its
aims adequately. While country-related interventions leave room for adjustments to na-
tional distinctions in the implementation process, company-related interventions exclude
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this adjustment step. Although the expected size effect on companies is independent
from the type of interventions, indirected interventions of regulatory adjustments re-
sult in more uncertainty about the actual implementation as regulation is additionally
adjusted by governments and regulators on the national stage after the European an-
nouncement. Therefore, companies are aware of forthcoming regulatory changes but
they do not know the actual implementation to the market structure which raises un-
certainty.
Moreover, the estimation results provide evidence that country-related interventions lead
to similar expectations of incumbents’ and competitors’ shareholders even if the reason
for an intervention is existing significant market concentration in favor of the incumbent.
These results support the findings in the literature on national regulations. Following
Krouse and Park’s (2003) argumentation, the efficiency increase of interventions out-
weighs the negative direct impact on the incumbent’s firm value. On the other hand,
company-related interventions, which mostly address incumbent providers, result in no
significant externalities on competitors.
The event study methodology is an established approach to evaluate regulatory actions.
So far, it has been mostly used for single company considerations in telecommunica-
tions (Rudolph and Johanning, 2004; Ehrmann et al., 2005; Bel and Trillas, 2005).
Employing it to multi-companies studies allows for an econometric analysis of market
reactions to regulatory changes. Nevertheless, some pitfalls have to be kept in mind,
which require attention also in future work: First, a selection bias exists as only larger,
listed companies could be considered. However, in regulated markets new entrants are
mostly smaller and not necessarily listed at a stock exchange, which means that larger
providers are over-weighted in a sample. Second, the methodology strongly relies on
expectations about the future outcome of today’s regulation as stock prices represent
discounted expected future profits. Finally, multi-company studies require the consider-
ation of cross-company effects. Multiple GARCH models allow for the consideration of
cross-effects. However, estimation complexity still demands a short-time structure.
Nevertheless, until today the empirical consideration of single changes in regulatory pat-
terns is mostly reduced to descriptive comparisons as a change in regulation can hardly
be statistically isolated from other market drivers because of its long-term orientation.
When keeping in mind the just-mentioned drawbacks, the event study methodology is a
practicable instrument to bring a regulator’s long-run expectations about a regulatory
intervention down to a short-run evaluation of the market.
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Appendix
Summary News and Companies
The following tables comprise an overview of the selected news (Table 8) and the com-
panies under scrutiny (Table 9). Relevant news are taken from the Cullen International
database whereas companies are taken from Thomson Financial Datastream and were
double-checked with regard to their main business subject and the regional reach.
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Table 8: Selected News
Date Event
02 Jan. 2000 Unbundling Regulation Scheme published in official journal
22 Mar. 2000 European Commission adopts Recommendation on "best practice" interconnection 
charges for 2000
30 May 2000 Judgement of the European Court of Justice on the Privatization of Public 
Enterprises and the use of Golden Shares
13 Jun. 2000 Directive on Local Loop Unbundling published
12 Jul. 2000 Commission adopts the Telecommunications Package
04 Oct. 2000 Telecommunications Council reaches Political Agreement on Unbundling 
Regulation
26 Oct. 2000 EP Plenary adopts Report on Unbundling of the Local Loop
06 Dec. 2000 Council adopts Unbundling Regulation
10 Jan. 2001 Commission Decision replacing Annex III of the Voice Telephony Directive
06 Apr. 2001 Access and Interconnection Directive
11 Jul. 2001 EP votes in the Lead Committee on the proposed Data Protection Directive
07 Dec. 2001 Council Political Agreement on the proposed Data Protection Directive
14 Feb. 2002 Final Adoption of the Telecom Package
25 Feb. 2002 European Commission phases out Recommendation on Call Termination Charges in 
Fix-Line Network
05 Jun. 2002 European Court of Justice Ruling on Golden Shares
27 Jun. 2002 Adoption of Data Protection Directive in Electronic Communications Sector
09 Jul. 2002 Commission publishes Guidelines on Market Analysis and the Assessment of 
Significant Market Power
30 Jul. 2002 Commission establishes European Regulators Group
23 Sep. 2002 Commission Directive on Competition in Electronic Communications Networks
09 May 2003 Council Conclusions on Lawful Interception and Mobile Pre-Paid Cards
14 May 2003 European Court of Justice rulings on the Golden Shares
27 Nov. 2003 IRG publishes Principles of Implementation and Best Practice on Mobile Call 
Termination Remedies
29 Mar. 2005 European Court of Justice ruling on Failure to transpose the 2003 Regulatory
Framework
01 Apr. 2005 European Commission Recommendation on Pricing of Leased Lines Part Circuits
27 Sep. 2005 European Commission Recommendation on Accounting Separation and Cost
Accounting
09 Feb. 2006 European Commission proposes new EU Regulation on International Roaming
13 Jul. 2006 European Commission Proposal for EU Regulation on International Roaming
26 Mar. 2007 European Parliament votes on Roaming get underway
07 Jun. 2007 Council gives Green Light to EU Roaming Regulation
18 Jul. 2008 Commission announces Plans to regulate SMS Roaming
24 Sep. 2008 Commission proposes to extend Roaming Regulation to cover SMS and Data
20 Nov. 2008 European Commission proposes to amend the GSM Directive
04 Jan. 2000 Commission Decision on the UK Request for a Deferment of the Implementation of 
Carrier Pre-Selection
21 Dec. 2000 Tariff Rebalancing: Commission sends Reasoned Opinion to Spain
24 Aug. 2001 Tariff Rebalancing: Commission sends Supplementary Reasoned Opinion to Spain
30 Apr. 2003 Commission approves 3G Mobile Network Sharing Agreement in the UK
16 Jul. 2003 Commission approves 3G Mobile Network Sharing Agreement in Germany
20 Jul. 2006 European Commission prohibits Public Funding of Broadband Project in the
Netherlands
Source: Information selected from the Cullen International Database
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Selected News (continued)
Date Event
18 May 2000 Commission publishes Vodafone Airtouch/Mannesmann Merger Decision
06 Sep. 2000 Commission clears Hutchison/NTT Docomo/KPN Mobile Joint Venture
21 Dec. 2001 Commission suspects Wanadoo (France) of Abusing its Dominant Position
27 Mar. 2002 Commission suspects KPN of Abusing its Dominant Position for the Termination of 
Calls on its Mobile Network
08 May 2002 Commission suspects Deutsche Telekom of Abusing its Dominant Position for 
Wholesale and Retail Local Loop Access
11 Jul. 2002 EC clears Merger between Telia and Sonera subject to conditions
06 Aug. 2002 Commission approves Break Up of Italian Mobile Operator BLU
22 Jan. 2003 Commission decides on State Aid for Mobilcom
05 Feb. 2003 European Commission asks the Netherlands to give up Golden Share in KPN
22 May 2003 Commission fines Deutsche Telekom for Charging Anti-Competitive Tariffs for 
Access to its Local Network
18 Dec. 2003 European Commission takes the Netherlands to Court on KPN Golden Share
19 Dec. 2003 Commission suspects Telia Sonera (Sweden) of having abused its Dominant 
Position in the Provision of High-Speed Internet Access
14 Jul. 2004 European Commission conditionally approves Restructuring Aid to Mobilcom
21 Jul. 2004 France Telecom ordered to pay back State Aid
27 Jul. 2004 International Roaming: Commission sends 'Statements of Objections' to O2 and 
Vodafone
27 Sep. 2004 European Commission clears Acquisition of Orange's Danish Mobile Telephony 
Business by Telia Sonera
14 Feb. 2005 International Roaming - European Commission sends 'Statements of Objections' to
T-Mobile and Vodafone in Germany
15 Nov. 2005 Commission opens In-Depth Investigation into Take-Over of Tele.Ring by T-Mobile
Austria
11 Jan. 2006 European Commission approves Acquisition of O2 by Telefonica subject to
Conditions
24 Feb. 2006 European Commission opens Abuse of Dominance Investigation against Telefonica
01 May 2006 European Commission and Austrian Regulator approve Acquisition of Tele.Ring by
T-Mobile subject to Conditions
05 May 2006 European Court of First Instance annuls Commission Decision on 3G National
Roaming between O2 and T-Mobile in Germany
05 Jan. 2007 European Commission Investigation into Funding of Amsterdam Fibre Network
02 Feb. 2007 Court of First Instance upholds Commission in Wanadoo Predation Case
06 Jul. 2007 European Commission fines Telefonica nearly €152m for Abuse of Dominant
Position ('Margin Squeeze')
23 Jul. 2007 European Commission approves Acquisition of Tele 2 France by SFR subject to
Conditions
Source: Information selected from the Cullen International Database
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Table 9: Selected Companies
ID Company Name Fix-line Market Mobile Market Listing Date
1 Belgacom X X  22 Mar. 2004
2 BT Group X X < 01 Jan. 1999
3 Deutsche Telekom X X < 01 Jan. 1999
4 France Telecom X X < 01 Jan. 1999
5 Hellenic X X < 01 Jan. 1999
6 KPN Kon X X < 01 Jan. 1999
7 Portugal Telecom X X < 01 Jan. 1999
8 Swisscom X X < 01 Jan. 1999
9 TDC X X < 01 Jan. 1999
10 Telecom Italia X X < 01 Jan. 1999
11 Telefonica X X < 01 Jan. 1999
12 Telekom Austria X X  21 Nov. 2000
13 Telenor X X  05 Dec. 2000
14 Telia Sonera X X  14 Jun. 2000
15 Vodafone X X < 01 Jan. 1999
16 3U Holding X  24 Nov. 1999
17 Acotel X X  09 Aug. 2000
18 Adept X  25 May 2006
19 Thus Group X X  05 Jan. 2004
20 Alternative Networks X X  17 Feb. 2005
21 Amitelo X  12 Nov. 2005
22 BNS Telecom X X  24 Nov. 2005
23 Buongiorno X  11 Oct. 2000
24 Cable & Wireless X < 01 Jan. 1999
25 Canisp X  15 Oct. 2003
26 Colt Telecom X < 01 Jan. 1999
27 Completel X  16 Sep. 2002
28 Convisual X  13 Jan. 2006
29 Drillisch X X < 01 Jan. 1999
30 Ecotel X X  29 Mar. 2006
31 Elisa X X  02 Jul. 1999
32 Eutelia X  19 Apr. 2000
33 Tele 2 F X X < 01 Jan. 1999
34 Fastweb X  27 Mar. 2000
35 Freedom4 X  02 Sep. 2004
36 Getmobile X  26 Apr. 2006
37 Teleunit X  26 May 2004
38 Inmarsat X X  20 Jun. 2005
39 Jazztel X  20 Dec. 2000
40 Kcom X  14 Jul. 2000
41 Keyyo X < 01 Jan. 1999
42 KPN Qwest X  09 Nov. 1999
43 Lannet X X  01 Jun. 2004
44 Messaging X X  25 May 2006
45 Millicom X < 01 Jan. 1999
46 Mobile Streams X  25 May 2006
47 Mobile Tornado X X  25 May 2006
48 Mobistar X < 01 Jan. 1999
49 Mobyson X < 01 Jan. 1999
50 Netmobile X  13 Jul 2005
51 Normaction X  28 Jul. 2005
52 PNC Telecom X < 01 Jan. 1999
53 Retelit X  03 Aug. 2000
54 Satcom X  15 Jul. 2005
55 Sonaecon X X  02 Jun. 2000
56 Spiritel X X  11 Mar. 2004
57 Tele 2 SE X X < 01 Jan. 1999
Source: Information taken from the Thomson Financial Database
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Summary Statistics and Tests of Pre-Estimations
Table 10: Summary Statistics and Test Results of the Iterative Estimation Process
(Incumbents)
Incumbents
Mean 
(Std. Dev.)
Minimum
(Share Min.)
Maximum
(Share Max.)
Mean 
(Std. Dev.)
Minimum
(Share Min.)
Maximum
(Share Max.)
AR
lag ar 4.414 2 6 4.675 2 7
(1.018) (0.020) (0.197) (1.300) (0.018) (0.130)
Chi_sq (df) 80.0 (5.414) 17.4 248.1 80.0 (5.675) 19.0 245.5
(37.2) (36.4)
log likelihood 44.1 -176.9 157.5 44.2 -176.3 156.5
(46.7) (46.5)
(G)ARCH
lag error_sq (=p) 1.778 0 8 1.791 0 8
(1.985) (0.374) (0.007) (1.963) (0.363) (0.005)
lag sigma_sq (=q) 1.534 1 6 1.562 1 8
(1.241) (0.781) (0.042) (1.376) (0.780) (0.014)
Chi_sq (df) 0.824 (1.279) 0.000 103.4 0.965 (1.496) 0.000 37.5
(4.367) (3.215)
log likelihood 49.5 -169.0 163.8 49.0 -168.4 162.0
(45.2) (45.5)
Technology Index Telecom Index
Note: lag sigma_sq = 0 corresponds to an ARCH process, whereas lag sigma_sq > 0
represents a GARCH process.
lag error_sq = 0 and lag sigma_sq = corresponds to the standard assumption of the usual
model.
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Table 11: Summary Statistics and Test Results of the Iterative Estimation Process
(Entrants)
Entrants
Mean 
(Std. Dev.)
Minimum
(Share Min.)
Maximum
(Share Max.)
Mean 
(Std. Dev.)
Minimum
(Share Min.)
Maximum
(Share Max.)
AR
lag ar 3.531 0 6 3.833 0 7
(1.852) (0.084) (0.191) (2.081) (0.072) (0.134)
Chi_sq (df) 74.9 0.000 1553.6 76.7 0.000 1561.1
(91.3) (90.9)
log likelihood 42.4 -347.6 830.1 44.3 -339.8 890.4
(243.2) (246.9)
(G)ARCH
lag error_sq (=p) 1.999 0 8 2.252 0 8
(2.230) (0.348) (0.023) (2.354) (0.328) (0.018)
lag sigma_sq (=q) 2.208 1 6 2.397 1 8
(1.835) (0.625) (0.123) (2.194) (0.620) (0.057)
Chi_sq (df) 54635 (2.204) 0.000 7.16 exp(07) 463.1 (2.088) 0.000 617316
(1974468) (15869)
log likelihood 54.5 -296.2 1191.8 62.4 -293.8 1289.4
(252.7) (259.9)
Technology Index Telecom Index
Note: lag sigma_sq = 0 corresponds to an ARCH process, whereas lag sigma_sq > 0
represents a GARCH process.
lag error_sq = 0 and lag sigma_sq = corresponds to the standard assumption of the usual
model.
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Additional Estimation Results
Table 12: Estimation Results Cross-Market Estimations
fix-line 0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0012 0.0003 -0.0008 -0.0022
( 0.0005 ) (0.0018 ) ( 0.0030 ) ( 0.0005 ) (0.0018 ) ( 0.0023 )
mobile 0.0001 0.0022 0.0017 0.0000 0.0020 0.0011
( 0.0006 ) ( 0.0021 ) ( 0.0036 ) ( 0.0001 ) ( 0.0021 ) ( 0.0036 )
# fix-line countries 0.0000 0.0002 0.0002 0.0000 0.0003 0.0002
( 0.0001 ) ( 0.0004 ) ( 0.0007 ) ( 0.0001 ) ( 0.0004 ) ( 0.0007 )
# mobile countries -0.0001 0.0002 -0.0006 -0.0001 0.0003 -0.0006
( 0.0001 ) ( 0.0004 ) ( 0.0008 ) ( 0.0001 ) ( 0.0004 ) ( 0.0008 )
incumbent 0.0002 0.0010 0.0022 0.0002 0.0013 0.0027
( 0.0005 ) ( 0.0016 ) ( 0.0028 ) ( 0.0005 ) ( 0.0016 ) ( 0.0028 )
foreign fix-line 0.0004 0.0004 -0.0015 0.0006 0.0004 -0.0016
( 0.0008 ) ( 0.0030 ) ( 0.0051 ) ( 0.0008 ) ( 0.0031 ) ( 0.0052 )
foreign mobile 0.0004 0.0004 0.0071 0.0004 -0.0004 0.0055
( 0.0009 ) ( 0.0033 ) ( 0.0057 ) ( 0.0001 ) ( 0.0033 ) ( 0.0057 )
constant -0.0005 -0.0041 -0.0022 -0.0005 -0.0044 -0.0021
( 0.0008 ) ( 0.0027 ) ( 0.0045 ) ( 0.0008 ) ( 0.0027 ) ( 0.0045 )
# Observations
F-Test (df)
R2
fix-line 0.0000 0.0003 0.0007 0.0000 0.0003 0.0007
( 0.0001 ) ( 0.0005 ) ( 0.0010 ) ( 0.0001 ) ( 0.0005 ) ( 0.0001 )
mobile 0.0000 0.0002 0.0007 0.0001 0.0008 0.0020 *
( 0.0001 ) ( 0.0005 ) ( 0.0011 ) (0.0001 ) ( 0.0005 ) ( 0.0010 )
# fix-line countries 0.0001 *** 0.0004 *** 0.0008 *** 0.0001 *** 0.0004 *** 0.0008 ***
( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0001 ) ( 0.0002 ) ( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0001 ) ( 0.0002 )
# mobile countries -0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0003
( 0.0000 ) (0.0001 ) ( 0.0002 ) ( 0.0001 ) ( 0.0001 ) ( 0.0002 )
incumbent -0.0006 *** -0.0035 *** -0.0070 *** 0.0000 -0.0035 *** -0.0072 ***
( 0.0001 ) ( 0.0004 ) ( 0.0008 ) ( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0004 ) ( 0.0008 )
foreign fix-line 0.0003 ** 0.0016 ** 0.0031 ** -0.0006 *** 0.0020 *** 0.0038 **
( 0.0001 ) (0.0008 ) ( 0.0015 ) ( 0.0001 ) ( 0.0001 ) ( 0.0015 )
foreign mobile -0.0004 *** -0.0024 *** -0.0050 *** -0.0005 *** -0.0028 -0.0061 ***
( 0.0001 ) ( 0.0008 ) ( 0.0015 ) ( 0.0001 ) ( 0.0007 ) ( 0.0015 )
constant 0.0010 *** 0.0054 *** 0.0104 *** 0.0009 *** 0.0048 *** 0.0094 ***
( 0.0001 ) ( 0.0001 ) ( 0.0013 ) ( 0.0001 ) ( 0.0006 ) ( 0.0012 )
# Observations
F-Test (df)
R2
Technology Index
CAR (11)CAR (3) CAR (7) CAR (11) CAR (3)
Telecom Index
CAV (7)
0.25 (7) 0.54 (7)
0.0011 0.0026 0.0023
16.65 (7) 15.71 (7) 16.39 (7)
0.24 (7) 0.43 (7) 0.40 (7)
CAV (3) CAV (7) CAV (11) CAV (3)
1177 1177 1177 1182 1182 1182
CAR (7)
CAV (11)
0.38 (7)
0.0813 0.0804 0.0840 0.0850
16.53 (7)
1177 1180 1180 1180
0.0720 0.0784
0.0012 0.0033 0.0023
15.41 (7)
1177 1177
16.12 (7)
Note: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent significance level, standard
errors are displayed in brackets.
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Table 13: Estimation Results of Particular Market Events
fix-line -0.0024 -0.0005 -0.0284 ** -0.0026 -0.0087 -0.0022 **
(0.0020 ) ( 0.0012 ) ( 0.0139 ) ( 0.0020 ) (0.0077 ) ( 0.0140 )
mobile . . . . . .
incumbent -0.0009 -0.0033 *** -0.0073 -0.0009 -0.0030 -0.0049
( 0.0008 ) ( 0.0006 ) ( 0.0047 ) ( 0.0008 ) ( 0.0027 ) ( 0.0046 )
foreign fix-line 0.0012 0.0016 -0.0098 0.0016 -0.0011 -0.0099
( 0.0014 ) ( 0.0014 ) ( 0.0102 ) ( 0.0015 ) ( 0.0060 ) ( 0.0100 )
foreign mobile -0.0019 -0.0009 -0.0120 -0.0017 -0.0037 -0.0082
( 0.0016 ) ( 0.0013 ) ( 0.0149 ) ( 0.0015 ) ( 0.0067 ) ( 0.0131 )
constant 0.0014 0.0071 *** 0.0101 0.0021 0.0063 0.0293 **
( 0.0010 ) ( 0.0016 ) ( 0.0070 ) ( 0.0023 ) ( 0.0082 ) ( 0.0147 )
# Observations
F-Test (df)
R2
fix-line -0.0002 -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0003
( 0.0002 ) ( 0.0013 ) ( 0.0025 ) ( 0.0002 ) ( 0.0012 ) ( 0.0024 )
mobile . . . . . .
incumbent -0.0006 *** -0.0032 *** -0.0065 *** -0.0006 *** -0.0033 *** -0.0068 ***
( 0.0001 ) ( 0.0006 ) ( 0.0011 ) ( 0.0001 ) ( 0.0006 ) ( 0.0011 )
foreign fix-line 0.0001 0.0005 0.0014 0.0003 0.0016 0.0038
( 0.0002 ) ( 0.0012 ) ( 0.0023 ) ( 0.0003 ) ( 0.0014 ) ( 0.0029 )
foreign mobile 0.0002 0.0007 0.0020 -0.0001 -0.0009 -0.0017
( 0.0003 ) ( 0.0016 ) ( 0.0034 ) ( 0.0003 ) ( 0.0013 ) ( 0.0025 )
constant 0.0009 *** 0.0052 *** 0.0105 *** 0.0014 *** 0.0071 *** 0.0140 ***
( 0.0001 ) ( 0.0007 ) ( 0.0014 ) ( 0.0003 ) ( 0.0016 ) ( 0.0032 )
# Observations
F-Test (df)
R2
CAV (3) CAV (7)
Technology Index Telecom Index
386 386 386 393 393
CAV (11)
CAR (3) CAR (7) CAR (11) CAR (3) CAR (7) CAR (11)
1.40 (8)
393
386 386 386 391 391
CAV (11)CAV (3)
5.48 (8)
391
CAV (7)
5.17 (8)
1.17 (8) 1.13 (8) 1.41 (8) 0.82 (8) 0.89 (8)
0.0181 0.0272 0.0171 0.0146 0.0285
0.0556
4.52 (8) 5.35 (8) 5.60 (8) 4.32 (8)
country dummies included
country dummies included
0.0640 0.0686 0.0546 0.0671 0.0744
0.0203
Note: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent significance level, standard
errors are displayed in brackets.
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